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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
BANK & TRUST, 
, ,:ocpordt ion, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
JTAH SECURITY MORTGAGE, INC., 
3 corporation, F. A. BADGER, 
i'.DRIENNE BADGER, JOHN N. BUSK, 
?A'!'RiCIA C. BUSK, H. MERVIN 
'1iALLACE, VIRGINIA S. WALLACE, 
M. WALLACE AND CAROLYN 
M. WALLACE, 
Defendants-Appellants. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Supreme Court No. 19086 
Plaintiff and respondent Continental Bank and Trust Company 
'hereinafter the "Respondent") by and through its attorneys Fabian & 
submit the following brief in response to the brief on 
of defendants and appellants. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Respondent seeks to enforce the liability of individual 
1efendants and appellants John N. Busk, Patricia C. Busk, H. Mervin 
Virginia s. Wallace, Robert M. Wallace and Carolyn M. 
·ioclace (hereinafter the "Appellants") as guarantors for three 
=- )m1ssory '.'\Otes. 
DISPOSITION OF CASE IN LOWER COURT 
On December 13, 1982, Judge Fishler of the Third District 
for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, granted Respondent's 
-1-
motion for summary judgment in "n action ari::;ing out of a defa", 
three promissory notes. A judgment was later <>ntered on FPbru,,, 
22, 1983, finding Appellants liable in the amount of 
plus interest and attor'."leys' fees. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellants' statement of facts contains several importan• 
omissions and misstatements 11hich must be addressed in ord<>r to 
assure a proper understanding of the issues involved. Thus, 
recitation of the facts is in order. 
Respondent commenced this action in the court below to 
recover the unpaid balances on three f?romissory notes that totct!': 
$87, 745. 42 that were executed by F. Alonzo Badger on behalf of IJt'' 
Security Mortgage, Inc., of which he was the President. The unpa.· 
notes covered three separate loans made to Utah Security 
Inc. (R. 76-79). In making these loans to Utah Security Mortgaa' 
Inc., Respondent r1>lied upon a Corporate Resolution Authorizing 
Borrowings that was executed on June 28, 1977, authorizing Mr. 
Badger to borrow money on behalf of Utah Security Mortgage, Inc. 
(R. 205-06) .l/ 
l/ The Corporate Resolution Authorizing Borrowings wa3' 
standard form that Respondent required all corporations to PXeCJ'° 
before they are lent money; it was signed by Dee F. Murphy, the 
President of Utah Security Mortgage, Tnc. and provided that at a 
Bodrd of Directors meeting held on June 28, 1977 a • 0 • 
adopted authorizing the following: 
[T]hat [Utah Security Mortgage, Inc.] borrow money from 
time from [Continental Ban'<] in such amounts as may be deem<: 
necessary for the use of [Utah Security Mortgage, Inc.] by_'-· 
officers herein authorized and empower1>d to execute and de.t -
the obligation or of [Utah Security Mortgage, 
(Footnote continued on next page) 
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The unpaid notes were executed by Utah Security Mortgage, 
,s part of an arrangement with Respondent for warehousing 
u.1'11llents of trust deeds as security for a line of credit -- a 
03 ::1ce that is common in the banking industry. (R. 338-39, 
Under this arrangement Respondent made loans to Utah 
i•c1r ity Mortgage, Inc. in order to finance mortgage loans that Utah 
security Mortgage, Inc. had made to certain borrowers for the 
:.:chase of real property. The mortgage loans made by Utah Security 
,·lort'jdge, I!'lc. were secured by trust deeds from the borrowers. (R. 
3;3-398, 464). The trust deeds were then assigned to Respondent by 
·:tah Security Mortgage, I!'lc. as collateral until Utah Security 
.·ior tgage, Inc. sold the trust deeds in the secondary market to 
the Utah Housing Finance Agency, the Federal National 
Association, or other entities in the business of 
:,rchdsing trust deeds. When a trust deed was sold in the secondary 
Mrket, Utah Security Mortgage, Inc. would use the money to repay 
. :s loans from Respondent. (R. 345-46, 349, 358) . 
Respondent did not perfect its security interest in the 
0 :s1g:;me!1ts of the trust deeds, because to do so would have 
:estricted the subsequent sale of the trust deeds in the secondary 
oot:;ote continued from previous page) 
and that F. Alonzo Badger, President [is] hereby authorized and 
•mpowered to execute and deliver in the name of [Utah Security 
'tor tgage, Inc.], and under or without its corporate sela, its 
promissory note or notes therefor to [Respondent] for all such 
sums so borrowed. 
duS-06). A similar Corporate Resolution Authorizing Borrowings 
•xecuted on behalf of Utah Security Mortgage, Inc. on February 
ll78, by i:s president, F. Alonzo Badger. (R. 207-08). 
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market.l/ (R. 142, 166-70). In order to obtain add1tiondl 
security for the notes, and as a condition for extending th,, :t, 
credit to Utah Security Mortgage, Inc., Respondent requirerl 
Appellants to execute guaranties on June 29, 1977, February 2, 
and May 5, 1978. (R. 174-76). 
The guaranty of May 5, 1978 is the one relied upon by 
Respondent in bringing this action. It covered all debts 
to Utah Security Mortgage, Inc. by Respondent up to $350,000, 
contained the following provision: 
[Respondent] shall not be required to proceed first 
[Utah Security Mortgage, Inc. ] or any other person, firm or 
corporation or against any collateral security held by it :ief 
resorting to the Guarantor [s] for payment; and the liabilit'1: 
the Guarantor [s] shall not be affected, released or exonerat2: 
by release or surrender of any security held for the oayment: 
any of the debts hereinabove mentioned. (Emphasis supplied,, 
(R. 176). 
In accordance with the warehousing arrangement between'.· 
Security Mortgage, I'1c. and Responde'1t, the three unpaid promissc' 
notes were secured by the assignments of four trust deeds. Thes' 
trust deeds were sold in the secondary market to the Utah Housi,,: 
Findnce Agency in August of 1979. The proceeds of the sale, whic 
under the warehousing arrangement were to go from the buyer to 
Respondent, instead went from the buyer to Utdh Security Mortgaa' 
Inc. The proceeds were never paid over to Respondent by Utah 
ll For example, the Utah Housing Finance Agency, to 
which Utah Security Mortgage, Inc. sold many of its trust deeds, 
issued regulations that prohibit the agency's purchase of any tr. 
deeds which are subject to an existing assignment. (R. 142, 
167-173). 
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_ ,,, :tf ;1ortgage, Inc. despite the repeated requests for payment 
made to Mr. Badger. 
It was later learned that these proceeds were embezzled by 
B•dqer who used them to invest in Bonneville Thrift and Loan 
("Bonneville Thrift"). (R. 479-81). In addition to his 
cost:ion with Utah Security Mortgage, Inc., Mr. Badger was the 
oces1dent of Bonneville Thrift. Appellants H. Mer'Jin Wallace and 
'0h2ct M. Wallace were at that time directors of both Bonneville 
"1r1ft dnd Utah Security Mortgage, Inc. Bonneville Thrift had been 
·ottfted by the Commissioner of Financial Institutions (the 
":'omm1ssioner") that its capital was impaired, and that it would not 
_ oermitted to its operations unless it received $100,000 
'c ddditional capital. 
When Respondent learned of the embezzlement, its Vice 
'c;>sident and loan officer, Lohr S. Livingston, arranged a meeting 
<.t'.l Mr. Badgec and H. Mervin Wallace to discuss the three unpaid 
The meeting too« place on or about November 30, 1979 in 
JPS?Ondent' s main office. (R. 479). At the meeting, Mr. Badger 
18.111tted he had wrongfully taken the money that was supposed to be 
'"'d to Respondent. Mr. Wallace offered to pledge 52,170 shares of 
,1:·1c< in Bonneville Thrift as security on the notes. The offer was 
dccepted oy Respondent. (R. 479-80). 
On May 23, 1980, the Commissioner took possession of 
:lie Thrift. Six days later, on May 29, 1980, James R. Brown, 
for Appellants, sent a letter to Glen E. Clark, then counsel 
requesting that Respondent sell the shares of 
•ville Thrift stock that it held, with the proceeds from the 
-5-
sale to be applied towards the unpaid Qalances on the 
notes. (R. 80). Since receiving Mr. Brown's letter, 
at a.ll times been willing to sell the stock, but it has 
contacted by anyone interested in purchasing any of the stock. 
Beca.use the Commissioner had taken possession of Bonneville ThrJf-
any purchase of its stock or assets would have to be negotiated 
with, and approved by, the Commissioner.11 
Respondent is still holding 52,170 shares of Bonneville 
Thrift stock that are worthless. The three promissory notes 
executed by F. A. Badger for Utah Security M'ortgage, Inc. 
unpaid. Relying upon the continuing guaranty signed by all of t:1e 
individual defendants on May 5, 1978, Respondent brought an actw 
in the Third District Court, State of Utah, against Appellants to 
recover the unpaid balances on the notes. On December 13, 1982, 
Judge Fishler granted Respondent's motion for summary judgment. 
1/ After the Commissioner took over Bonneville Thrift 0 ". 
May 23, 1980, Citizens Bankshares was then required to deal direc' 
with the Commissioner in purchasing any assets of Bonneville 
Thrift. On July 8, 1980, Michael R. Carlston, counsel for Citiz--
Bankshares, submitted a written proposal on its behalf to the 
Commissioner proposing the purchase of certain assets of Bonne111c.-
Thr ift. (R. 84-86). An agreement between Citizens Bankshares a 
the Commissioner was signed on August 18, 1980 in which Citizens 
Bankshares acquired some of the assets of Bonneville Thrift. 
(R. 87-90). At no time, however, did Citizens Bankshares evPr rn' 
an offer to purchase any of the stock in Bonneville Thrift, 
including the stock pledged to Respondent. (R. 99-100). 
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ARGUMENT 
•PPELLANTS WAIVED THEIR RIGHTS TO THE COLLATERAL UNDER THE 
;c;.,PRESS TERMS OF THE GUARANTY AGREEMENT. 
Appellants cite several cases -- including Shaffer v. 
445 P.2d 13, 5 UCC Rep. 772 (Wyo. 1968) -- for the 
,10pns1tion that Appellants have been discharged from their 
·01trdctJal obligations under the guaranty agreement by virtue of 
'"spond?nt's alleged failure to prevent impairment of both types of 
:ctlateral -- the assignments of trust deeds and the Bonneville 
stock. In so arguing, Appellants overlook the fact deemed 
;ec1s1ve by the court below in granting Respondent's motion for 
;cmmary judgment -- that by the express terms of the guaranty 
Appellants consented to any such impairment of the 
:·Ji lateral. 
Section 3-606(1) (b) of the Uniform Commercial Code, Utah 
:Jde Annotated § 70A-3-606, provides: 
The holder discharges any party to the instrument to the extend 
that without such oarty's consent the holder ... unjustifiably 
1mpa1rs any collateral for the instrument given by or on behalf 
of the party or any person against whom he has a right of 
recourse. (Emphasis supplied). 
fhe statute, by expressly conditioning discharge by impairment of 
on the lack of consent of the party seeking discharge, 
cia11ly contemplates that a party may waive his impairment defense. 
'ts principle is underscored by Comment 2 to § 3-606, which 
'?rnplates that such a waiver may be granted by contract: 
:onsent may be given in advance, and is commonly incorporated in 
the instrument; or it may be given afterward. It requires no 
ons1deration and operates as a waiver of the consenting party's 
.13nt to claim his own discharge. (Emphasis supplied). 
Wn1te and summers, Uniform Commercial Code, 2nd ed. at p. 527. 
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The guaranty agreement between Respondent and Appellant, 
contains the type of consent envisioned by the draftsmen of 
Uniform Commercial Code. The agreement provides: 
.. the said Bank shall not be required to proceed first 
against the Debtor or any other person, firm or corporation 
0 
against any collateral security held by it before resorting t; 
the Guarantor for payment; and the liability of the Guarantoc 
shall not be affected, released or exonerated by release or 
s ur: render of any secu r: i ty held for the payment of any of the 
debts hereinbefore mentioned, nor by the release of any other 
guarantor or surety. 
(R. 176). By agreeing to be liable as guarantors notwithstanding 
any "release or surrender" of the collateral, Appellants waived ac. 
rights to claim discharge by virtue of impairment of the collateu 
whether by Respondent's alleged failure to perfect a security 
interest in the trust deeds, or by Respondent's allegedly negligee 
failure to sell the shares of Bonneville Thrift. 
A. The Guaranty Agreement Expressly Provided that Respondent 
had No Duty to Perfect a Security Interest in the Trust 
Appellants, by waiving their rights to discharge resultc· 
from a "release or surrender" of the collateral, relieved Respond;· 
of any duty it would otherwise have had to protect the trust deed; 
by perfecting a security interest in them. Several cases have he. 
that identical or similar language in loan agreements prevented 
borrowers or sureties from claiming discharge due to failure on·· 
part of the lender to perfect a security interest. 
The leading case on this point is Etelson v. Suburban L 
££.:_, 283 A. 2d 408, 9 UCC Rep. 1371 (Md. 1971). In Ete ls on, the 
secured party's failure to file a security interest in the 
collateral caused the secured party to lose all rights in the 
- 8-
. literal when its owner was declared bankrupt. 283 A.2d at 409. 
c,H,oties, citing some of the same cases cited by Appellants 
claimed that the secured creditor's failure to perfect was 
i 0 Jnjustified impairment of the collateral under § 3-606(1) (b) of 
uniform Commercial Code, which discharged their liability as 
on the underlying promissory note. The court rejected this 
dcjurnent, because the borrowers, by consenting under provisions of 
:ne note to the "release or exchange of any collateral without 
1otice" waived any claim they might have had to discharge through 
J1JJStified impairment. The court held that failure to perfect a 
security interest was a type of "release" of the collateral: 
It is clear from the express wording of the endorsement that the 
[secured creditor] could have released the collateral at any 
time to the Etelsons and without the release affecting the 
Etelsons' obligation to pay. It would be illogical to rule that 
the [secured creditor] had a duty to file the financing 
statement and its failure to do so released the endorsers, when 
under the endorsement, it could have released the collateral 
·•1th impunity. 
ld. at 4 10 . 
That a contractual waiver covering a "release" of 
collateral includes a failure to perfect a security interest in that 
was also made clear in the recent case of Executive Bank 
cf Fort Lauderdale v. Tighe, 429 N.E. 2d 1054, 32 UCC Rep. 894 (N.Y. 
-fol J • In Tighe, the lower court distinguished a "release" from a 
'11lure to file on grounds that the former is "a deliberate act at a 
··'He time whereas the latter is a negligent act which occurs at 
threshold of the transaction." The New York Court of Appeals 
'' iowed Etelson in rejecting this distinction: 
From a guarantor's point of view, it makes no difference when or 
with whdt intent, short of bad faith, the collateral is reduced 
-9-
or reledsed. From his ?Oint of view, t'1e effect (i'1crease 
potential liaoility through the decrease of his source of 
reimbursement) is exactly the same. 
420 N.E.2d at 1058. 
In Reeves v. Hunnicutt, 168 S.E.2d 663, 6 ucc Rep. 
App. 1969), a debtor claimed that his obligations under a prom 1 s,· 
note were discharged because the secured creditor failed to 
a security interest in the The court rejected this 
argument, because the note contained a provision that the "sJrrec .. 
or release" of any collateral by the secured creditors would not 
affect the debtor's liability. 168 S.E.2d at 664. Hunnicutt is 
particularly apposite to this case, because its provision 
to the "surrender or release" of collateral is virtually identico. 
to the provision here, which speaks of "release or surrender" of 
collateral. 
The holdings of Etelson and Hunnicutt have been acceptec 
every court which has dealt with this issue. Indeed, at least '.•· 
appellate courts have relied on Etelson to affirm motions for 
summary judgment against guarantors who consented to a "release" 
"surrender" of collateral yet claimed unjustified impairment by 
virtue of the secured party's failure to perfect. In Greene v. c. 
of Upson, 201 S.E.2d 463, 13 UCC Rep. 1102 (Ga. 1973), the guac;· 
agreement permitted the secured [)arty to "without notice, surrec 
. all or any r:>art of the collateral." 201 s. E. 22 ac 464 . 
Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's granting of 
judgment, as "under the agreements here, the atir:>ellant consente: 
the impairment of the collateral and can not now complain". D 
Similarly, in Haney v. Deposit National BanK, 362 so." 
- 10 -
_5 UCC 206, (Miss. 1978), the Mississippi Supreme Court, 
, t'1g on and affirmed summary judgment against a 
- whose payment agreement provided that "the Bank may at its 
• surrender any collateral without affecting the liability 
:C dny obligor"; the court held that failure to perfect the security 
."terest was one method of surrendering the collateral, which the 
Jtantor had agreed would not extinguish her obligation. 362 So. 2d 
12 s 2. 
Etelson was also followed in American Bank of Commerce v. 
540 P. 2d 1294, 17 UCC Rep. 1052 (Noe'!. 1975), the case relied 
hy the court below. Under the guaranty agreement, the 
•nder bank had the right to "waive and release" the security at any 
without affecting the guarantor's obligation to pay . .!£· at 
_:93. The court held that by agreeing to such express language, the 
:"arantor could not claim that his liability was extinguished by the 
·,onK's failure to perfect a security interest: 
a guarantor or surety expressly and unequivocally consents 
to a waiver or release of his rights in the collateral, he will 
not be heard to complain of the failure of the guarantee to 
perfect its security therein in the first instance. 
ii- at 1299. 
is especially relevant to this case because the 
.• rantor there argued, as do Appellants here, that the secured 
owes the guarantor a duty to perfect his security interest 
oclateral, and failure to do so discharges the guarantor, even 
-. consented to the failure to perfect. To this effect, both the 
Jnlor in and Appellants here cited St. Paul Fire and 
-,. I:isurance co. v. New Jersey Bank and Trust, 250 A.2d 57 (N.J. 
-11-
rev'd on other grounds, 137 N.J. Super. 294' 349 
Sup. 1969), 
( 1971) . Covolo rejected this argument as applying solel; to 
suretyships at common law, 540 P.2d at 1296, fn. 2, thus 
establishing that the enactment of UCC § 3-606 modifies the 
law of suretyships by allowing guarantors to waive then ri•i":: 
the collateral. 
Appellants argue that is distinguishable fcom., 
present case by claiming that a contractual provision for the ·•a 
of guarantor's rights in the security was present y•: 
absent here. This contention is wholly without merit. 
guaranty dgreement provided that the lender may "waive and rele,:-
the security without affecting the guarantor's liability, whLle :·-
present contract speaks of "release or surrender" of the secur1> 1· 
Even assuming that a "surrender" of collateral is not 
a "waiver" of it, so that Covolo would not precisely cover this 
situation, Hunnicutt, and Haney can be cited for the 
proposition that a guarantor who gives the secured party a righ: 
"surrender" the collateral has consented to any failure to perfec· 
and cannot claim that such a failure extinguishes his liability. 
Appellants also attempt to distinguish 
only to situations i:1 which the documents "specified on theic f3:• 
that they were to be unsecured. This argument is misleading. A 
section of the Covolo opinion did deal with a promissory note 
on its face specified that it was to be unsecured but the sec:.· 
which Respondent and the lower court here rely discussed 
promissory note which did !l.21 state on its face that it was to·· 
unsecured. 540 P.2d at 1298-99. 
- 12-
.;pp<e Llants would also distinguish from the present 
" that her<e extrinsic evidence -- mainly in the form of the 
,'lceernent and the course of dealing between Utah Security 
','J 0 , f '1C. and Respondent is available to prove that the 
'..es intended Respondent be liable for failure to perfect its 
,-.:.Hit/ interest in that the collateral, notwithstanding the 
.,pi1c1t provision to the contrary in the guaranty agreement. Even 
c evidence would so indicate, Utah law makes the evidence 
.",;atidoiP here, because the guaranty agreement -- the source of 
·.a ool1gations between Appellants and Respondent -- is clear and 
·,ambtgJous on this point. 
This Court has repeatedly stressed that extrinsic evidence 
·"available only if the instrument embodying the contract and 
JC'.igations between the parties is ambiguous, v. 
=,:st Colonv Life Insurance Co., 593 P.2d 534, 536 (Utah 1979), and 
cJrol evidence, such as evidence relating to the course of dealing, 
:ac be orily as a last resort in the event that both the 
.cstrurnent und contemporaneous writings are ambiguous, Continental 
3e.c,: and Trust v. Bybee, 306 P.2d 773, 775 (Utah 1957). Here, under 
and its progeny -- all of which decided the issue by looking 
iol 0 l1 to the respective writings, and not to extrinsic evidence 
· 11strurnent clearly provides that Appellants are not relieved of 
,c1lity by Respondent's failure to perfect a security interest, so 
.,•, law, as expressed in Williams and Bybee, requires that 
•Ste evidence not be considered here. 
It is also argued in Appellant's Brief is 
1J,:shable from the present case because Respondents acted in 
-13-
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with a lack of "good faith" dnd "honest:; in fact" l:t 
loan to Utah Security Mortgage, Inc. 
Respondent induced Utah Security Mortgaqe, T'."\c. "-"agree t'> j 
unsecured loan agreement, knowi'.1g that U::ah Secur it:; 
believed it had obtain a loan unles3 it was secured. Brief Qf 
Appellants at p. 18. Even assuming that there is a 
for this contention, it cdnnot lie f'.Jr procedural reasons. 
allegation of bad faith is merely a rewording of Appellants' 
allegation of fraud that was made before the District Court. T' 
allegation was disregarded by the court ::ielow· because it was •.,.:-
for the firsc time on oral argument before the District Court. 
Continental Bank and Trust Co. v. Utah Security Mortgage, 
Civil No. C8l-3l62 (Third District Court, December 11, c98; 
The lower court's decision on this issue should be affirmed. F:i 
is an affirmative defense under: Rule 8(c) of the Utah Rules of:_ 
Procedure, so like other affirmative defenses, it must be ['lead;: 
the part] opposi:-ig summary judgment in its affidavits on tc1e 
for: summary judgment or in its dnswer to the complai:-it. Ross l t':'. 
Vogel, 134 F.2d 908, 912 (2nd Cir. 1943), 6 :-toore's Federal 
Pr:actice, p. 56-736. Since upon review of a lower court decis 
granting summar1 judgment, this Court applies the same staoclad 0 
the trial court in determining the existence of mater ia'- issJe: 
fact, Durham v. Margetts, 571 P.2d 1332, 1334 i'Jtah 1977), roi-
Court should disregard Appellants' allegations Gf "ba-i fa1t:1 "" 
refuse to o:-i this poi:-it. 
- l 4 -
The Gc1arant1 Agreement Exoressl1 Provided that Respondent 
Duty to Sell the Stock Before it Deoreciated. 
Apoecl3nts also allege that Respondent's failure to sell 
.1oc• of Bonneville Thrift when the stock was worth enough to 
c,,,,, amoc1:-it of the loan constit-.ited an impairment of the 
.ateral wh1ch relieves them of their obligations under UCC 
-6J6, Code A:-inotated § 70A-3-606. Again, even assuming 
1s a basis for these allegations, Appellants have no 
_.,/ to complain, because they consented to any such failure by 
that their liability would not be affected by "release" of 
'"-:: co .1. r a l. . 
As discussed aoove, courts have constrc1ed such a provision 
coC"lsent oy the guarantor to action or omission on the part 
secured creditor which reduces the value of the collateral or 
In Tighe, suora, the court held that a 
·1s1on consenting to a "release" of the collateral operates a 
·- ""t to a:-iy act or omission that increases the guarantor's 
'cJ'.<?C)ttal liability through the decrease of his source of 
TO•csement", 429 N.E.2d at 1058. 
This principle was illustrated in De Kalb County Bank v. 
:'46 S.E.2d 116, 24 TJCC Rep. 716 (Ga. App. 1978). I n !!.s.1fil , 
failed to procure credit life insurance on the life of 
·0ccowar, as required by the loan and guaranty agreements. The 
tnat eve:-i thoc1gh the creditor's omission did amount to an 
·rneGt oE the collateral, the guarantor could not claim 
J':;'., oecac1se he "expressly consented to such impairment when 
1·1.,;d the guara:-ity agreement," 246 S.E.2d at 117. 
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Tighe and clearly establish that a guarantor who 
consents to a release of collateral consents to any omission , 
secured party which results in d loss of the collateral's value 
Since Appelldnts consented to any such omission, they cannot no·• 
complain of Respondent's alleged failure to sell the Bonneville 
Thrift shares when they had some value. 
C. Appellants Could Have Prevented Any Alleged Depreciat 10• 
the Value of the Shares. 
Appellants' claim that they were injured by Respondent's 
failure to sell the shares of Bonneville Thrift pledged as 
collateral at a time when they allegedly had value is further 
undermined by the fact that Appellants could have obtained the 
shares such time and sold them. Under the doctrine of 
subrogation, Appellants, as guarantors of Utah Security Mortgage': 
obligation to Respondent, would have become entitled to the shar 0 : 
upon payment in full of the amounts due on the promissory notes, 
See Restatement of Restitution, § 76 (1954); 73 Am.Jur.2d 
Subrogation § 53 (1974). Upon obtaining possession of the shares, 
Appellants could have then sold the shares by themselves, thereby 
eliminating any alleged harm to them which resulted from Resronrie· 
not selling the shares. 
II. RESPONDENT OBSERVED STANDARDS OF REASONABLE CARE AS ESTABLIS' 
IN THE GUARANTY AGREEMENT. 
Appellants, by permitting Respondent to "reledse or 
surrender" the collateral, not only consented to Respondent's 
conduct, but also agreed to modify the standard of reasondble cCi 
in preserving the collateral that Respondent was required to ob· 
under UCC § 9-207, U.C.A. § 70A-9-207. 
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Section 9-207(1) provides: 
A secured party must use reasonable care in the 
ustody and preservation of collateral in his possession. In 
the case of an instrument or chattel paper reasonable care 
taking necessary steps to preserve rights against prior 
parties unless otherwise agreed. 
·ornment l to § 9-207 states that under § 1-102 ( 3) the parties to a 
secJrity agreement may determine what constitutes "reasonable care" 
:o' tne purposes of their agreement, so long as the standards set 
a:e not "manifestly unreasonable". 
Courts have given the parties to a guaranty agreement broad 
to determine the applicable standard of care under § 9-207. 
;c Jnion Planters National Bank v. Markowitz, 468 F. Supp. 529 (W.D. 
:'ecn. 1979) the guaranty agreement provided: 
.. In order to hold the undersigned liable hereunder, there 
shall be no obligation on the part of [the secured creditor] at 
anytime to first resort to, make demand on, file claim against, 
or exhaust its remedies against the Debtor, anyone or more of 
the undersigned, ... or to resort to and exhaust its remedies 
against any collateral (orl security 
;08 F.Supp. at 533 (emphasis supplied). The court held that this 
Jrovision set a standard of reasonable care, that freed the secured 
:reditor from any duty to perfect a security interest in the 
-olldteral, and that the prov is ion was valid under § 9-207 (1): 
The first sentence of [ § 9-207 ( 1) J essentially requires a 
secured party to use reasonable care not to destroy or injure 
coUateral in his possession ... The second sentence of 
9-207 (1)] adds the element that the duty of reasonable care 
cequires that the secured party take steps to preserve his 
· .yhts in that collateral unless otherwise agreed. We interpret 
li•ts to mean that the duty of reasonable care does not require a 
oecured party to preserve its rights in collateral when the 
agree otherwise. Here, the guaranty agreement clearly 
states that [the secured party] need not take steps to protect 
'H3 rights in the collateral. Thus, [his] obligation of 
ed.sonable care under [§ 9-207] was satisfied. 
Supp. at 534 (emphasis in original). 
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Many of the cases the hold that a fadure to perfect 
3 
security interest in collateral constituted a "release" 
by contract also contain an alternative holding that the contrac· 
provision established a standard of performance, disclaiming an; 
obligation to per feet on the part of the secured creditor, that ,, 
valid under§ 9-207(1). Etelson, supra, 283 A.2d at 
410. In Covolo, supra, the court held that the agreement, by g
11
_. 
the secured creditor the right to "waive and release" the 
collateral, established a standard of reas0nable care that was 
"manifestly unreasonable," so the agreement was valid under 
§ 9-207(1) as a determination of the standard of care of the 
collateral to which the secured party would be held. Therefore, 
Covolo court concluded, the guarantor could not claim discharge 
under § 9-207 because the secured party failed to perfect a secur.· 
interest. 540 P.2d at 1298. 
Applying these precedents to the instant case, it must Je 
concluded that Respondent had no duty to perfect a security inte,;: 
in the trust deeds, since the guaranty agreement validly disclaime. 
such a duty by allowing Respondent to "release or surrender" the 
co 1 lateral. Furthermore, because Etelson and indicate tr.a· 
valid consent for the purposes of § 3-606 (1) (b) also constitJte 0 
modification of the "reasonable care" standard of§ 9-207(11, 
"release or surrender" provision also operates to modify the 
standard of care applicable to the Bonneville Thrift stock. 
the "release or surrender" provision constituted consent to th• 
alleged failure to make a proper sale of the stock -- for reasc": 
discussed above it also establishes the standard of care 
- ls-
1
, 1caule to the stock, under which Respondents had no duty to sell 
stock before it became worthless. 
, ! [ RES POND ENT HAD NO DUTY TO PURSUE ANY OTHER SECURITY BEFORE 
dRINGING THIS ACTION AGAINST APPELLANTS. 
A. Recent Opinions of This Court Have Expressly Rejected the 
Existence of Such a Duty. 
This Court has repeatedly held in recent cases that a 
secJred creditor whose security consists solely of personal property 
,,as no duty to proceed against the collateral before bringing an 
,,:tion against sureties or absolute guarantors. In Kennedy v. Bank 
Jf :::ohraim, 594 P. 2d 881 (Utah 1979), a secured creditor brought an 
i::1on against the surety and other parties liable on a promissory 
co:e. The parties claimed that they should not be held personally 
.table, because the secured creditor is required to satisfy its debt 
from the collateral before proceeding against the surety and the 
Jther parties. The court rejected this argument for situations in 
,1n1ch the collateral is personal property by looking to § 9-501 of 
tne Uniform Commercial Code, Utah Code Annotated S 70A-9-501, which 
orov ides: 
When a debtor is in default under a security agreement, a 
secured party . may reduce his claim to judgment, foreclose 
or otherwise enforce the security interest by any available 
Judicial procedure. 
'!.y1ng upon Michigan National Bank v. Marston, 185 N.W.2d 47, B UCC 
l 17) 1:'1ich. App. 1970), this Court read the Uniform Commercial 
,Jee rlS allowing the secured party a broad choice of remedies. 
Marston, this Court added: 
fhe existence of a security interest in no way affects the 
of the debt. It merely provides the secured party 
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with dn immediate source of recovery in addition to the st,· 
remedies of an unsecured creditor. 
594 P.2d at 884. 
This Court then concluded in Kennedy: 
We hold that the [secured creditor] has an option to pursue 
of the parties liable on this '1ote, which is 5ecured solel; 
personal property, and may also, at its option, ignore that 
and sati5fy its judgment from other property in the 
nands of the Judgment debtor. 
1£. Since the collateral here is in the form of persondl proper· 
Respondent had no duty to proceed agaipst the collateral before 
bringing this action against Appellants as sureties. 
The strong policy i'1 favor of giving secured parties a 
broad choice of remedies in case of default was reiterated by t: .. 
Court in Strevell-Paterson Co. v. Francis, 646 P.2d 741 (Utah 
19 82) . In that case, the guarantor signed an absolute guaranty 
a loan to the corporation of which he was a director; in additio: 
the guaranty, the corporation granted the creditor a security 
interest in the corporation's inventory and accounts receivable. 
When the corporate borrower defaulted, the secured creditor obta. 
a default judgment against it. Instead of collecting on that 
judgment, the secured creditor brought a separate action against 
guarantor, who argued that the secured creditor must first 
its remedies against the debtor and the coLlaterdl before 
an action against the guarantor. This Court rejected the 
guarantor's argument because he was liable under an absolute 
guaranty: 
The guarantee at issue i:-1 this appeal i3 a:-1 absolute 
of payment . It contai:-is :-10 exoress or implie<l con<litio· 
liability and no contractual that the creditor 
satisfaction elsewhere before commencing action on the 
-20-
The fact that the creditor obtained a judgment 
•111nst the debtor but failed to allege execution on that 
J.dgment or exhaustion of his remedies against the debtor or the 
does not alter the nature of the guarantor's 
tn0ependent obligation as a guarantor. 
i..!.· 3t 743-44. In so holding, this Court upheld the lower court's 
1rant of summary judgment against the guarantors. Since Appellants 
concede that the guaranty in this case is an absolute guaranty 
Brief, at p. 11), under Strevell-Paterson they cannot 
this action by claiming that Respondents have failed to 
nroceed ctgainst the collateral. 
Appellants' position in this case is even weaker than the 
cOStt1ons of the guarantors in Kennedy and Strevell-Paterson. In 
:11s case, the guaranty agreement contains express language 
Jrov1d1ng that the liability of the guarantor would not be affected 
-! tne release or surrender of any security, while the guaranty 
o?reements in Kennedy and Strevell-Paterson contained no such 
.01·;udge. Thus, there is an even stronger basis here than here was 
.1 Kennedv and Strevell-Paterson for holding that Respondent had no 
j_t/ to proceed against the collateral before commencing this action 
>Ja1nst Appellants. 
B. Doctrine of Election of Remedies Inapplicable. 
Appellants seek to distinguish Strevell-Paterson and 
from the present case in that here Respondent had a choice 
: remedies -- proceeding against the collateral or proceeding 
,,_nst Appellants as guarantors -- and exercised the former choice 
giving notice of an election to sell the Bonneville 
--.:.ft shares. Appellants ussert that since Respondent made this 
it is barred from exercising the other alternative --
-21-
proceeding against Appellants -- by the doctrine of election of 
remedies. Assuming arguendo that there is a factual basis for'. 
argument, it is inapplicable here for both procedural and 
substantive reasons. 
This Court should disregard Appellants' argument on thi: 
issue because it was not presented to the court below. This 
will not consider on appeal a legal theory not presented to the 
lower court, Branch v. Western Petroleum, Inc., 657 P.2d 267, 2n 
(Utah 1982). Appellants did not raise the issue of election oE 
remedies before the District Court, either in their memorandum h 
support of their motion for summary judgment, or in their 
in opposition to respondent' motion for summary judgment, so the 
issue is not properly before this Court and should be disregarded. 
Even if the issue of election of remedies were properly 
raised, it would still be inapplicable to this case, as the 
transactions here are governed by the Uniform Commercial Code. 
Section 9-501(1) of the Code, Utah Code Annotated§ 70A-9-50l(l), 
provides: 
When a debtor is in default under a security agreement, a 
secured party has the rights and remedies provided in this Pa'. 
and ... those provided in the security agreement. He may 
reduce his claim to judgment, foreclose or otherwise enforce t 
security interest by any available judicial procedure .. · T'.· 
rights and remedies referred to in this subsection are 
cumulative. 
All courts that have construed this provision have held that by 
expressly making cumulative the remedies of the secured party upo· 
default, it eliminates the common law doctrine of election of 
remedies. 69 Am.Jur.2d § 557, P. 446, and cases cited there:· 
Utah adopted this position in Kennedy v. Ban'< of Eohra im, 
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i. 
_onnedy, this Court relied heavily on Michigan Nationdl Bank v. 
185 N.W.2d 47, 8 UCC Rep. 1375 (Mich. App. 1970), which, as 
,:.0 :0 ned,L noted, found that the intent of the Code is to "broaden the 
ooc1ons open to a creditor after default rather than to limit them 
Jnder the old theory of election of remedies". 594 P.2d at 884. 
The inapplicability of the doctrine of election of remedies 
cases governed by the Uniform Commercial Code was stressed in 
Fertilizer, Inc. v. Beekman, 308 N.W.2d 347, 31 UCC Rep. 1489 
•,Neb. 1981). In Beekman, a secured creditor brought an action 
agd1nst a debtor who hdd defaulted on a promissory note and obtained 
a dga inst the debtor. The judgment was later vacated, and 
cne lower court held that the secured party could not maintain a 
separate action under the security agreement because he had elected 
to proceed against the debtor, and under the doctrine of election of 
:emed1es, his rights accrued solely from the judgment. The Nebraska 
S1preme Court reversed, holding that under § 9-501(1), a secured 
:reditor by pursuing one remedy, is not precluded from asserting his 
rights under another remedy. 308 N.W. 2d at 349. 
In dCcord with Beekman is Ruidoso State Bank v. Garcia, 587 
P.2d 435 (N.M. 1978), a case involving facts very similar to those 
-" Beekman. In construing § 9-501(1), the Ruidoso court stated: 
There is nothing ambiguous about this statutory provision. It 
plainly states that all the remedies of proceeding on the note 
dnd the security agreement are cumulative. Each of them remains 
1n force although efforts have been made to collect the debt by 
the alternate means. 
P.2d at 437. 
Beekman and Ruidoso establish that even if Appellants could 
dS a matter of fact that Respondent attempted to sell the 
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Bonneville Thrift stock, it is not barred from utilizing the 
alternative remedy of proceeding against Appellants as guarantor 
Thus, Appellants' allegation that Respondent attempted to disp08 , 
the stock presents no issue of fact that is material to the outcs· 
of this case. 
CONCLUSION 
The decision of the District Court granting summary 
judgment in favor of Respondent should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted this of July, 1983. 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN, 
A Professional Corporation 
By T"' ., ;\ -------
Albert J. Colton 
By __ Ran d a 11 A. Mackey 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
This is to certify that on this of July, 1983, I 
.;aused to be mailed two true and correct copies of the foregoing 
8r 1ef of Respondent, postage prepaid, to James R. Brown, Esq., 
Jdrdine, Linebdugh, Brown & Dunn, 370 East South Temple, Salt Lake 
city, Utah 84111; to Ron S. Barker, 2870 South State Street, Salt 
LdKe city, Utah 84115; and to Adrienne Badger, prose, 694 East 1900 
sooth, Bountiful, Utah 84010. 
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